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ABSTRACT 
 
A Singular-Value-Based Semi-Fragile Watermarking Scheme for  
Image Content Authentication with Tampering Localization 
 
by 
 
 
Xing Xin, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2010 
 
 
Major Professor:  Dr. Xiaojun Qi 
Department:  Computer Science 
 
 
This thesis presents a novel singular-value-based semi-fragile watermarking scheme 
for image content authentication with tampering localization.  The proposed scheme first 
generates a secured watermark bit sequence by performing a logical “xor” operation on a 
content-based watermark and content-independent watermark, wherein the content-based 
watermark is generated by a singular-value-based watermark bit sequence that represents 
intrinsic algebraic image properties, and the content-independent watermark is generated 
by a private-key-based random watermark bit sequence.  It next embeds the secure 
watermark in the approximation subband of each non-overlapping 4×4 block using the 
adaptive quantization method to generate the watermarked image.  The image content 
authentication process starts with regenerating the secured watermark bit sequence 
following the same process mentioned in the secured watermark bit sequence generation.  
It then extracts a possibly embedded watermark using the parity of the quantization 
iv 
 
results from the probe image.  Next, the authentication process constructs a binary error 
map, whose height and width are a quarter of those of the original image, using the 
absolute difference between the regenerated secured watermark and the extracted 
watermark. It finally computes two authentication measures (i.e., M1 and M2), with M1 
measuring the overall similarity between the regenerated watermark and the extracted 
watermark, and M2 measuring the overall clustering level of the tampered error pixels.  
These two authentication measures are further seamlessly integrated in the authentication 
process to confirm the image content and localize any possible tampered areas.  The 
extensive experimental results show that the proposed scheme outperforms four peer 
schemes and is capable of identifying intentional tampering, incidental modification, and 
localizing tampered regions. 
(63 pages) 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Significance 
Trustworthy digital multimedia plays an important role in applications, such as news 
reporting, intelligence information gathering, criminal investigation, security 
surveillance, and health care.  However, all too often this trustworthiness can no longer 
be taken for granted since users can easily manipulate, modify, or forge digital content 
without causing noticeable traces, using low-cost and easy-to-use digital multimedia 
editing software.  Therefore, digital multimedia authentication has become an important 
issue. 
Recently, digital watermarking techniques have been considered as one of the most 
promising techniques for multimedia authentication.  The goal of watermarking is to 
embed into the image data a mark that can identify the copyright owner of the work.  
Among these, semi-fragile watermarking techniques have been proposed to protect 
copyright and prove tampering of the digital content.  These techniques allow acceptable 
content-preserving manipulations, such as common image processing and 
JPEG/JPEG2000 compression, while detecting content-altering malicious manipulations 
such as removal, addition, and modification of objects.   
Background 
Here, I briefly review the history of digital watermarking techniques and its six 
important properties followed by a discussion the general framework of semi-fragile 
watermarking techniques and some representative semi-fragile watermarking techniques. 
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Digital Watermarking 
Digital watermarking is a label applied to digital media to automatically detect and 
possibly prosecute copyright infringement.  Digital watermarking is not a new technique. 
Its history can be traced back to 13
th
 century Europe.  At that time, a visible personal 
mark or signature was superimposed on an image that needed protection [1].  It is a 
simple but very effective method that is still widely used as a security protection method 
nowadays. 
In the early years of digital watermarking history, despite its visibility, it worked well.  
Visible watermarking is clearly not ideal for art work, since superimposed marks bring 
distortions that decrease the visual quality.  In general, an efficient digital watermarking 
requires the following properties [2]: 
1. Invisibility:  The watermark should be embedded into the image, video, or audio 
signal and not be visible to the user.  The minimum requirement of invisibility is to 
keep the distortion introduced by the watermark lower than the just-noticeable 
distortion (JND) of the image.  Several researchers have invented JND based on the 
contrast sensitivity function (CSF) and Watson model [3, 4]. 
2. Tamper detection:  Watermark detection results of the existence of certain watermark 
information should be very reliable.  This is related to two concepts, false positive 
alarm and false negative alarm.  A false positive error happens when there is no 
watermark in the host media, though the detector declares there is.  On the other hand, 
a false negative error happens when there is watermark in the host media, though the 
detector declares there is not. 
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3. Discrimination of incidental distortion and malicious tampering:  The most important 
and difficult issue in digital watermarking, this discrimination includes tolerance to 
common image processing (i.e., image enhancement, and median filtering) and image 
compressions (i.e., JPEG, and JPEG2000).  A semi-fragile watermarking scheme is 
supposed to be able to survive all those distortions but still detect malicious 
tampering (i.e., adding, removing, and changing objects). 
4. Security: The embedded watermark should be impervious to forgery and 
manipulation. 
5. Identification of tampered areas: The location of altered areas should be highly 
disposed to estimation and the other areas highly disposed to verification as 
authenticated. 
6. Oblivion with no transmission of any secret information:  The original image or 
explicit information derived from the original image should not be needed in the 
authentication process. 
Semi-Fragile Watermarking 
Figure 1 shows the framework of a typical semi-fragile watermarking scheme.  It 
consists of two components: the embedding scheme and the extraction scheme.  Here, I 
briefly review these two components. 
The Embedding Scheme.  The embedding scheme consists of two steps:  watermark 
generation and watermark embedding. 
The watermark generation step generates the watermark(s) to be embedded.  In 
general, the watermark can be a randomly generated binary sequence, a binary image, or  
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Figure 1. The framework of a typical semi-fragile watermarking scheme. 
a content-based signature.  A content-based signature can be obtained by feature 
extraction techniques. 
The watermark embedding step embeds the generated watermark message into the 
original image. A variety of watermark embedding techniques have been proposed in the 
literature. These techniques can be categorized into spatial domain-based and frequency 
domain-based embedding techniques. In general, frequency-based watermarking 
techniques are better than spatial-based watermarking techniques from the following two 
perspectives: 
1. Frequency-based watermarking techniques can achieve better invisibility than 
spatial-based watermarking techniques because a small modification of some of 
the coefficients in the frequency domain causes small global changes when 
transforming back to the spatial domain (i.e., all the coefficients in the 
transformed spatial domain are changed on a small scale). 
2. Frequency-based watermarking techniques are more robust than spatial-based 
watermarking techniques because the relationship of coefficients in the frequency 
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domain cannot be easily affected by attacks which modify the coefficients in the 
spatial domain. 
Most watermarking techniques use either an additive or a multiplicative function in 
the frequency domain, i.e., discrete Fourier transform (DFT), discrete cosine transform 
(DCT), or discrete wavelet transform (DWT) to embed watermark information. Both 
types of functions keep the least significant bits or the parity of transformation 
coefficients, or the relationship of certain transformation coefficients. 
The Extraction Scheme.  The extraction scheme consists of two steps: watermark 
extraction and watermark authentication. 
The watermark extraction step should be specifically designed to pair with the 
embedding scheme to retrieve the embedded watermark under various intentional or un-
intentional attacks that may occur in the real world.  
The watermark authentication step compares the extracted watermark with the 
embedded watermark to authenticate the image content. For watermarked images that 
undergo some incidental distortions, there will be little or no difference between the 
extracted and the embedded watermarks. That is, this slight difference can be used to 
indicate that watermarks can be successfully extracted under incidental distortions.  In 
other words, the scheme is robust to incidental distortions. For the watermarked images 
that undergo malicious attacks, the extracted watermark will be significantly different 
from the embedded watermark. That is, this significant difference can be used to validate 
the authenticity of the image content and to localize the distortion areas if malicious 
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attacks do take place. In other words, the scheme is fragile to malicious tampering 
distortions. 
Next, I briefly review several representative semi-fragile watermarking schemes in 
the domain of DCT or DWT.  In general, these schemes use the chosen transform domain 
as the media to embed and extract watermarks.  They then use the extracted watermarks 
to authenticate the digital content and localize the tampered areas if possible. 
DCT-based Semi-fragile Watermarking Schemes.  Lin et al. [5] propose embedding 
Gaussian distribution-based block patterns in the DCT domain.  Tampering detection is 
accomplished by verifying the correlation on these block patterns.  This scheme can 
identify altered regions within a watermarked image with 75% accuracy under moderate 
compression and near 90% accuracy under light compression.  Lin and Chang [6] 
propose to generate the invariant features at a predetermined JPEG quality factor and 
embed these features into mid-frequency of 8×8 DCT blocks.  This scheme is robust 
against substitution of blocks and improves on the method proposed in [5], in that false 
alarms near edges hardly occur.  However, it fails to detect malicious attacks that 
preserve the sign of the DCT coefficients.  Ho and Li [7] propose a similar yet better 
scheme by using the relationship of DCT coefficients in low and middle frequencies.  
This scheme protects the authenticity of a compressed watermarked image while the 
JPEG quality is higher than the authors’ predefined lowest authenticable quality.  Maeno 
et al. [8] propose two methods to address the shortcomings of [6].  The first method adds 
a random bias factor to the fixed decision boundary to catch the malicious manipulation 
and keep the false alarm rate low.  The second method uses a non-uniform quantization 
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scheme to improve accuracy in encoding the relationships between paired transform 
coefficients and increase the alteration detection sensitivity. 
DWT-based Semi-fragile Watermarking Schemes.  Kundar and Hatzinakos [9] embed 
a watermark in a quantized DWT domain.  Zhou et al. [10] propose to embed a signature 
from the original image into the wavelet coefficients.  Kang and Park [11] incorporate the 
just noticeable differences feature to improve the performance of [5] for discriminating 
malicious from nonmalicious attacks.  Hu and Han [12] propose to extract image features 
from low-frequency wavelet coefficients to generate two watermarks: one for classifying 
the intentional content modification and the other for indicating the modification location.  
Liu et al. [13] use Zernike moments in the DWT domain as features for the authentication 
task.  Zhu et al. [14] apply the block-mean-based quantization strategy to embed the 
inter-block and intra-block signatures in the DWT domain for tamper detection and 
localization, respectively.  Yang and Sun [15] embed the watermark by integrating the 
human visual system model to modify the vertical and horizontal subbands of image 
subblocks.  Che et al. [16] use the dynamic quantized approach to embed watermark in 
low-frequency wavelet coefficients.  Cruz et al. [17] employ the vector quantization 
method to embed a robust signature into the approximation subband of each image sub-
block.  However, all these schemes are only robust to moderate JPEG compression (i.e., 
JPEG compression of higher than a 50% to 60% quality factor).  The false alarm rates for 
watermarking schemes proposed in [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17] are high under common 
image processing attacks.  Specifically, the schemes proposed in [9] and [13] achieve a 
32×32 detection unit, and Cruz’s scheme [17] achieves a 16×16 detection unit. 
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Organization of Thesis 
In this paper, we propose a novel semi-fragile watermarking scheme by generating a 
secure watermark that results from performing the logical operation “xor” between a 
content-based watermark and content-independent watermark. Here, a content-based 
watermark is a singular-value-based feature, and a content-independent watermark is a 
private-key-based random watermark.  The proposed scheme then embeds the secure 
watermark in the wavelet domain using the adaptive quantization method.  The proposed 
watermarking scheme further utilizes two authentication measures derived from a binary 
error map to authenticate the image content and localize the tampered areas.  This scheme 
also possesses all the desired properties mentioned earlier for an effective authentication 
watermarking scheme. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II presents the proposed 
scheme, Chapter III analyzes the performance of the proposed scheme, Chapter IV 
presents the extensive experimental results of the proposed scheme, and Chapter V 
summarizes the conclusions and provides directions for future work. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
The proposed semi-fragile watermarking scheme consists of four components: 
secured watermark generation, watermark embedding, watermark extraction, and 
watermark authentication.  This chapter starts with a brief introduction of several 
important notations and concepts used in my thesis, followed by a detailed explanation of 
each component. 
Important Notations and Concepts 
In this section, I briefly introduce the singular value decomposition (SVD), DWT, 
and the terminology used in the following sections for ease of discussion of the proposed 
approach. 
SVD  
Any m×n real-valued matrix A with m >= n can be written as the product of three 
matrices: A = USV
T
. The columns of the m×m matrix U are mutually orthogonal unit 
vectors, as are the columns of the n× n matrix V. The m× n matrix S is a pseudo-
diagonal matrix, and the diagonal entries are known as SVs (Singular Values) of A. While 
both U and V are not unique, the SVs are fully determined by A. That is, the SVs of a 
matrix are unique.  The SVs of a square matrix of size n× n are n descending values 
along the diagonal of the matrix S. From the viewpoint of image processing applications, 
SVs represent intrinsic algebraic image properties.  Figure 2 shows a simple example of  
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Figure 2. Example of singular value decomposition. 
singular value decomposition.  The two singular values are 5 and 3, which are located 
along the diagonal of the matrix S. 
DWT  
DWT includes many kinds of transforms, such as Haar wavelet, Daubechies wavelet, 
and others. My thesis utilizes the Haar wavelet.  For an input represented by a list of 2
n
 
numbers, the Haar wavelet transform may be considered to simply pair up input values, 
storing the difference and passing the sum. This process is repeated recursively, pairing 
up the sums to provide the next scale: finally resulting in 2
n
 − 1 differences and one final 
sum. For ease of understanding, Figure 3 shows the workflow of DWT. After applying a 
1-level DWT on an image, we get the approximation subband LL, the horizontal subband 
LH, the vertical subband HL, and the diagonal subband HH. Moreover, if we want to 
apply a 2-level DWT on the image, we just simply apply another 1-level DWT on the 
approximation subband LL. After applying a 2-level DWT, we also get the approximation 
subband LL2, the horizontal subband LH2, the vertical subband HL2, and the diagonal 
subband HH2 of the approximation subband LL other than subbands LH, HL, HH. 
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Figure 3. The workflow of discrete wavelet transform. 
 
Table 1 Watermarking Terminology. 
Host image/Original image The image used for embedding the watermark 
Probe image The image used for watermark extraction 
W and W’ The original and extracted watermark sequences 
I and I’ The original and watermarked images 
k The secret key 
Terminology  
For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to summarize the most commonly used 
terminology. Various research groups, such as image processing, communication theory, 
and cryptography, have studied watermarking. Although, they have slightly different 
terminology from each other, most of these approaches share some common standards or 
rules. Table 1 provides a guide to the most frequently used terminology. 
Secured Watermark Generation 
Using the specific relationships of SVs of the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal 
subbands of each 4×4 block of the original image, we generate a content-based 
watermark that represents intrinsic algebraic image properties to facilitate the 
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authentication process.  The detailed steps for generating the content-based watermark 
are as follows: 
1. Divide the original image I into non-overlapping 8×8 blocks. 
2. For each 8×8 block (i.e., Blk), modify its coefficient (i.e., Blk(x,y)) to an integral 
multiple (i.e., modified-Blk(x,y)) of the quantization matrix Q (shown in Figure 4) 
which is used in JPEG compression [18], where 1 <= x <= 8 and 1 <= y <= 8.  See 
formula (1).  After applying this on each block, the original image is represented 
as a quantized image modified-I. 
                                     ),(×)),(/),((),(mod yxQyxQyxBlkroundyxBlkified                       (1) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Quantization matrix. 
3. Divide the quantized image modified-I into non-overlapping 4×4 blocks. 
4. For each 4×4 block modified-Bi, where i ranges from 1 to the total number of 
blocks, perform the following operations: 
4.1.Divide into 2×2 sub-blocks to obtain subblock1i, subblock2i, and subblock3i 
(shown in Figure 5).  The upper left subblock is not used.  Here, I briefly  
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Figure 5. Illustration of subblocks. 
explain why it is not used.  As discussed in the next section, Watermark Embedding, we 
choose to use the upper-left value X of the approximation subband LL of modified-Bi as 
the media for the embedding process.  X is exactly related to the four values in the un-
used subblock.  So, we choose not to use this upper left sub-block to ensure the 
robustness of both the content-based watermark and the embedding scheme. 
4.2.Apply SVD on subblock1i to obtain three matrices U1i, S1i, and V1i, where 
subblock1i = U1i×S1i×V1i
T
.  Apply the SVD on subblock2i and subblock3i to 
obtain U2i, S2i, and V2i, and U3i, S3i, and V3i, respectively. 
4.3.Generate a watermark bit based on the relationship of SVs of subblock1i, 
subblock2i, and subblock3i.  These SVs correspond to the three values (i.e., S1i 
(1, 1), S2i (1, 1), and S3i (1, 1)).  The singular values are in descending order 
as introduced above, so we choose the first one, which is the most notable and 
stable, to generate the watermark bit.  The rules for generating the content-
based watermark bit CWi are as follows: 
4.3.1. Generate bit B1 using S1i (1,1) and S2i (1, 1) based on the relationship: 
14 
 
                                                   


 

Otherwise0
(1,1)2  (1,1)1if1
1
ii SS
B                                           (2) 
4.3.2. Generate bit B2 using S2i (1,1) and S3i (1, 1) based on the relationship: 
                                                   


 

Otherwise0
(1,1)3  (1,1)2if1
2
ii SS
B                                           (3) 
4.3.3. Generate bit B3 using S3i (1,1) and S1i (1, 1) based on the relationship: 
                                                   


 

Otherwise0
(1,1)1  (1,1)3if1
3
ii SS
B                                           (4) 
4.3.4. Generate the content-based watermark bit CWi using: 
                                                    )),,(( 321 BBBxorxorCWi                                                    (5) 
For security reasons, we also generate a random content-independent watermark bit 
sequence IW, which has the same length as the content-based watermark.  This 
watermark bit sequence is generated by using the Mersenne Twister algorithm [19] and a 
private key k [6]. Using the correct private key, the same IW can be generated for the 
original image and its probe images (i.e., possibly distorted watermarked images). 
The embedded secured watermark Wi is finally generated by performing the logical 
operation “xor” on the random watermark IWi and the content-based watermark CWi. 
Watermark Embedding 
We divide the original image into non-overlapping 4×4 blocks and sequentially 
embed W in the wavelet domain of each 4×4 block.  We utilize the parity of the quantized 
value of the approximation subband to embed the watermark.  To ensure the watermark’s 
invisibility and increase robustness against common image processing attacks, we choose 
to use the upper-left value X of the approximation subband as the media for the 
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embedding process.  The strategy of embedding a watermark bit is as follows.  Compute 
the quantized value Xq by getting the integer part of X divided by a quantizer q.  If the 
parity of Xq equals to the embedding bit, change X to Xq×q.  Otherwise, change X to Xq×q 
plus q.  All these changes ensure that the parity of the modified X is consistent with the 
embedding bit.  It should be noted that the bigger q is, the bigger the changes, 
consequently, the worse the quality of the watermarked image, and the stronger the 
robustness.  In our system, the value of q is adaptive and different for each block. 
Specifically, as introduced in the section entitled Secured Watermark Generation, we use 
the total of B1, B2, and B3 (e.g., Sum) of each block to decide the corresponding 
quantization value of q. 
                                                        












3   if       17
2   if       15
1   if       13
0 if11
321
321
321
321
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
q
                                           (6) 
The detailed embedding procedure is shown below.  It should be noted that the 
boundary check process summarized in step 2.5 is necessary when some blocks are all 
0’s (black) or all 255’s (white). 
1. Divide the original image I into non-overlapping 4×4 blocks. 
2. For each 4×4 block Bi and its corresponding embedded watermark bit Wi, perform 
the following operations: 
2.1 Apply the 1-level Haar wavelet transform to obtain the approximation 
subband LLi, the horizontal subband LHi, the vertical subband HLi, and the 
diagonal subband HHi. 
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2.2 Quantize the upper-left value of LLi (i.e., LLi(1,1)) by its quantizer q, as 
computed by equation (3),using: 
                                                          qLLX iq /)1,1(                                                    (7) 
2.3 Modify the LLi(1,1) value by: 
                                     






otherwiseqqX
WXifqX
LL
q
iqq
i
)2,mod(
)1,1(
                                       (8) 
where mod(Xq, 2) computes the remainder of Xq divided by 2. 
2.4 Apply the inverse 1-level Haar wavelet transform to obtain the watermarked 
block. 
2.5 Perform the boundary check on the 2×2 upper-left corner of the watermarked 
block to ensure that its four values are in the proper range.  For an 8-bit 
grayscale image, this range is [0- q/4, 255+q/4].  If any of the four values in 
the 2×2 upper-left corner falls outside of the proper range, apply the following 
remedy strategies: 
a) If one value is larger than the upper-bound of the allowable range, 
modify LLi(1,1) by: 
                                                  
qqXLL qi )1,1(                                                       (9) 
b) If one value is smaller than the lower-bound of the allowable range, 
modify LLi(1,1) by: 
                                              qqXLL qi  2)1,1(                                                     (10) 
c) Apply the inverse 1-level Haar wavelet transform to obtain the corrected 
watermarked block.  If any value in the 2×2 upper-left corner of the 
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corrected watermark block falls outside of the proper range, modify its 
value by adding or subtracting 4×q to ensure the modified value is in the 
proper range and the parity of Xq is intact. 
Figure 6 illustrates the effects of embedding the watermark in the wavelet domain, 
using the above quantization method.  This figure shows that each LLi(1,1)’s is modified 
to the nearest 0 bin (the dashed line) or 1 bin (the solid line) according to its quantized 
value Xq and the embedding bit Wi. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Illustration of the quantization process. 
Watermark Extraction 
The watermark extraction process uses the same blocking strategy to divide the image 
into non-overlapping 4×4 blocks.  It then uses the parity of the quantized upper-left value 
X’ of the approximation subband of each block to extract the watermark bit.  Here, the q 
value used for quantization is calculated by using the same strategy as in the watermark 
embedding process.  The detailed steps are as follows: 
1. Divide the probe image I’ into non-overlapping 4×4 blocks. 
2. For each 4×4 block Bi’, perform the following operations: 
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2.1 Apply the 1-level Haar wavelet transform to obtain the approximation 
subband LLi’, the horizontal subband LHi’, the vertical subband HLi’, and the 
diagonal subband HHi’. 
2.2 Quantize the upper-left value of LLi’ (i.e., LLi’(1,1)) by its quantizer q 
computed by equation (5) using: 
                                              )/)1,1('(' qLLroundX iq                                                 (11) 
2.3 Set the extracted watermarked bit EWi as mod(Xq’, 2). 
Watermark Authentication 
We generate a binary error map to perform the watermark authentication task.  First 
of all, we simulate the process of generating the secured watermark W’ by applying the 
logical operation “xor” on the content-based watermark CW’ and the content-independent 
random watermark IW’. Here, CW’ is a regenerated content-based watermark using the 
same strategy introduced in the Secured Watermark Generation section, and IW’ is a 
content-independent watermark that is exactly the same as IW introduced in the Secured 
Watermark Generation section.  Since the extracted watermark EW reflects the changes 
of local intensity resulting from attacks, we construct the error map, i.e., ErrorMap, by 
mapping the absolute difference between EWi and W’i (i.e., |EWi−W’i|) onto its 
corresponding 4×4 block.  The 0’s and 1’s in ErrorMap indicate the match and mismatch 
between extracted and embedded watermarks, respectively.  In other words, any pixel 
with the value of 1’s in ErrorMap is an error pixel.  In the proposed system, we classify 
the error pixels into three categories: strongly tampered, mildly tampered, and isolated 
error pixels.  Figure 7 illustrates these three categories of error pixels in red solid circles  
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Figure 7. Examples of three categories of error pixels shown in red solid circles. (a) 
strongly tampered error pixel, (b) mildly tampered error pixel, and (c) isolated error pixel. 
 
using a window size of 3×3.  Specifically, we consider an error pixel as strongly 
tampered if at least four of its eight neighbors are error pixels (marked by black solid 
circles); an error pixel as mildly tampered if one, two, or three of its eight neighbors are 
error pixels; and an error pixel as isolated (i.e., likely caused by noise) if none of its eight 
neighbors is an error pixel.  As a result, we do not consider the isolated error pixel as the 
tampered error pixel and consider both strongly tampered and mildly tampered error 
pixels as tampered error pixels.  It should be noted that the window size and thresholds of 
the number of neighboring error pixels in the window for defining strongly tampered and 
mildly tampered error pixels can be set differently based on the specific application 
requirement.  They also determine the sensitivity of the authentication process. 
We next define two authentication measures, M1 and M2, to protect copyright and 
prove tampering, where M1 measures the overall similarity between extracted and 
embedded watermarks and M2 measures the overall clustering level of the tampered error 
pixels.  We compute M1 as the percentage of error pixels (i.e., 1’s) in ErrorMap.  We 
compute M2 as the ratio between the number of strongly tampered error pixels and the 
number of tampered error pixels in ErrorMap.  The detailed steps for computing M2 are 
as follows: 
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1. Initialize TamPixNum and StrongTamPixNum as 0’s, where TamPixNum stores 
the number of tampered error pixels and StrongTamPixNum stores the number of 
strongly tampered error pixels. 
2. For each error pixel, perform the following operations: 
2.1.  If it is tampered (i.e., mildly or strongly tampered), add TamPixNum by 1. 
2.2.  If it is strongly tampered, add StrongTamPixNum by 1. 
3. Compute M2 by: 
                              




 

otherwise
0if0
2
TamPixNum
ixNumStrongTamP
TamPixNum
M
                                 (12) 
Finally, we design a quantitative method to decide the authenticity of the probe image 
based on the two authentication measures.  The algorithmic view of the authentication 
process is summarized below: 
1. Compute M1 using ErrorMap. 
2. If M1 ≤ Tmedian (i.e., 0.15), update ErrorMap as its 3×3 median filtering result. 
3. Compute M2 using ErrorMap. 
4. If 0 ≤ M1 < Thalferrorbit, 
a. if M2 < Tmalicious, the probe image is authenticated 
b. else the probe image is maliciously attacked. 
5. If Thalferrorbit ≤ M1 < Terrorbit. 
a. if M2 < Tmalicious, the probe image is incidentally attacked 
b. else the probe image is maliciously attacked. 
6. If M1 ≥ Terrorbit, the probe image is not embedded with watermarks. 
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It is important to apply the median filtering on ErrorMap when M1 is less than or 
equal to 0.15 (i.e., at most 15% of 4×4 blocks are detected as distorted).  Due to the small 
amount of distortions, we can infer that the probe image must have undergone small 
malicious attacks or moderate incidental attacks.  That is, the tampered regions would be 
small and tend to cluster if malicious attacks occurred, and the tampered regions would 
be small and tend to scatter if moderate incidental attacks occurred.  This median filtering 
removes all mildly tampered error pixels.  It also treats non-error pixels as error pixels if 
the non-error pixels are surrounded by at least five error pixels.  That is, this filtering 
keeps the clustered error pixels intact and makes scattered mildly tampered error pixels 
and isolated error pixels disappear.  As a result, the small malicious attack leads to a 
larger M2 value due to the removal of mildly distorted error pixels.  The extensive 
experiments show that the value of 0.15 for Tmedian works well on all 30 test images and 
all the simulated attacks. 
The remaining thresholds, i.e., Terrorbit, Thalferrorbit, and Tmalicious, involved in the 
authentication process are determined based on the predefined false negative probability 
of 10
-6
.  The threshold for Terrorbit is derived as follows.  The probability for a pixel in 
ErrorMap to be detected as 0 or 1 is 0.5.  So, each pixel is a binomially distributed 
random variable.  The expected value (i.e., E(errorbit)) and the variance of error bits (i.e., 
Var(errorbit)) are respectively 0.5×numel and 0.5×(1-0.5)×numel=0.25×numel, where 
numel is the total number of pixels in ErrorMap.  Therefore, we deduce the threshold for 
detecting if the probe image has been embedded with the watermark bits by: 
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Here, Φ approaches the normal distribution with an expected value of 0 and a 
variance of 1 when numel is large.  Hence, we consider that the image is not embedded 
with the watermark if M1 ≥ Terrorbit = 0.4837 and use a half of Terrorbit as Thalferrorbit, which 
is the threshold for distinguishing the incidentally attacked watermarked images from 
authenticated watermarked images. 
The threshold for Tmalicious is derived as follows.  The probability for a pixel to be 
detected as tampered error pixels is ½[1−(½)8]=255/512=0.4980.  The probability for a 
pixel to be detected as strongly tampered error pixel is 
3184.0512/1635.0)( 988
7
8
6
8
5
8
4
8  CCCCC .  Then, the expected value (i.e., 
E(strongtampix)) and the variance of strongly tampered error pixels (i.e., 
Var(strongtampix)) are 163/512×numel and 163/512×(1-163/512)×numel = 
0.3184×0.6816×numel = 0.2170×numel, respectively.  The expected value of tampered 
error pixels (i.e., E(tampix)) is 0.4980×numel.  Therefore, we deduce the threshold for 
detecting malicious attacks by: 
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That is, we consider the attack on the watermarked image is malicious if M2 ≥ 
Tmalicious = 0.6085. 
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Validation of Defined Error Pixels and  
Authentication Measures 
 
The definitions of the three categories of error pixels and the two authentication 
measures are guided by the following observations.  1) Most error pixels would spread 
across the error map if incidental attacks were made on the watermarked image.  2) Most 
error pixels would cluster in distorted regions if malicious attacks were made on the 
watermarked image.  Figure 8 demonstrates these two observations by showing the error 
pixel distribution after performing no attack and performing three attacks (i.e., obvious 
malicious attack by adding a black square, JPEG compression attack with the 80% 
quality factor, and obvious malicious attack by adding a black square followed by JPEG 
compression of an 80% quality factor) on the standard watermarked “Lena” image, 
respectively.  For the error pixel distribution under each attack, we sequentially display 
the distribution of all error pixels (i.e., ErrorMap), tampered error pixels, and strongly 
tampered error pixels.  We clearly observe the following. 1) Figure 8(a) shows that 
ErrorMap contains all 0’s when no attack occurs to the watermarked image.  In other 
words, all the watermark bits are successfully extracted, and the probe image is authentic.  
2) Figure 8(b) shows that ErrorMap contains exclusively clustered tampered error pixels 
when the malicious attack is applied to the watermarked image.  The strongly tampered 
error pixels are also clustered within the tampered areas under this malicious attack 
without any JPEG compression. 3) Figure 8(c) shows that ErrorMap contains a majority 
of randomly spread tampered error pixels when the incidental attack is applied to the 
watermarked image.  The strongly tampered error pixels tend to be isolated under the  
24 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Illustration of the error pixel distribution. 
incidental attack.  4) Figure 8(d) shows that ErrorMap contains a majority of clustered 
tampered error pixels resulting from the malicious attack, and a few randomly spread 
tampered error pixels resulting from the JPEG compression attack, when the combined 
malicious and JPEG attack is applied to the watermarked image.  The strongly tampered 
error pixels are also clustered within the tampered areas under this combined attack.  
Based on the predefined thresholds, the system successfully detects each watermarked 
image shown in Figure 8(a), Figure 8(b), Figure 8(c), and Figure 8(d) as authenticated, 
maliciously attacked, incidentally attacked, and maliciously attacked, respectively. 
Figure 8 illustrates the error pixel distribution: (a) the watermarked image; (b) the 
maliciously attacked watermarked image without any JPEG compression; (c) the 80% 
JPEG compressed watermarked image; (d) The maliciously attacked watermarked image 
followed by 80% JPEG compression, along with their corresponding ErrorMap’s in 
terms of all error pixels, tampered error pixels, and strongly tampered error pixels.  The 
size of the error map is enlarged for easy reading of error pixels. 
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CHAPTER III 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In the following, we quantitatively evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme 
in terms of the quality of the watermarked image, the robustness of the secured 
watermark, the tampering detection sensitivity, and the localization capability. 
Quality of the Watermarked Image 
In the proposed scheme, image distortion is caused by modifications of the wavelet 
coefficients in the embedding process.  Both the quantizer q and the watermark payload p 
(i.e., the number of watermark bits embedded in the host image) affect the quality of the 
watermarked image.  A larger quantizer incurs more modification to the wavelet 
coefficients and consequently results in more degradation of the watermarked image.  
Similarly, a larger payload leads to more degradation of the watermarked image.  In the 
following, we derive the mean squared error (MSE) incurred in the embedding process, 
using the assumption that the original wavelet coefficients are uniformly distributed over 
the range of [kq, (k+1)q] for Zk  .  When the parity of the quantization result of the 
original wavelet coefficient LLi(1, 1) matches the embedded watermark bit Wi, LLi(1,1) is 
modified to the lower-bound kq, and the MSE caused by this quantization is: 
                                                     3
1 2
0
2
1
q
d
q
MSE
q
  
                                                    (15) 
Otherwise, LLi (1, 1) is modified to the upper-bound (k+1)q and the MSE caused by 
this quantization is: 
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As a result, the average distortion caused by embedding one watermark bit is q
2
/3, 
and the MSE of embedding p watermark bits in the block-based wavelet domain is: 
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where W and H are the width and the height of the host image, respectively.  According 
to Parseval’s theorem, the MSE of the entire image equals its counterpart in the wavelet 
domain [20].  Therefore, the PSNR value of the watermarked image is: 
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where bs denotes the size of each embedding square block.  The above clearly reveals 
that the quality of the watermarked image is determined by both p and q.  Smaller p’s and 
q’s lead to larger PSNR values.  In the proposed system, p equals to W×H/16.  Based on 
formula (14), if a fixed quantizer is used for the quantization of watermark embedding 
process, the expected PSNR values are 44.12, 42.66, 41.42, and 40.33 for quantizers of 
11, 13, 15, and 17, respectively. 
The experimental results on 30 standard 8-bit grayscale images show that by using 
the proposed scheme with the adaptive quantizer, the average PSNR value of their 
watermarked images is 41.39.  This average is consistent with the computed expected 
values and is higher than the empirical value (i.e., 35.00 db) for the image without 
perceivable degradation [21]. 
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Robustness of the Secured Watermark 
Since we use the same strategy to generate the secured watermark in both the 
watermark embedding process and watermark authentication process, the robustness of 
the secured watermark is important to the proposed scheme.  In other words, ideally, the 
regenerated secured watermark at the extraction side is supposed to be the same as the 
secured watermark generated in the embedding process.  To analyze the robustness of the 
secured watermark, we next clarify three aspects of the analysis process, which aspects 
are also the main steps of generating the secured watermark. 
Using a specific non-overlapping 4×4 block Blk as an example, we start the 
explanation with the quantization of non-overlapping 8×8 blocks, using the quantization 
matrix used in JPEG compression.  By applying this step, modification within the range 
of [-coef’s/2, coef’s/2] can be preserved.  That is, when modifications have been applied 
to block Blk, the secured watermark bit can still be regenerated if the modification on a 
particular value of a block falls within the range of [-coef’s/2, coef’s/2], where coef’s is 
the  quantization value at the same position of the quantization matrix (shown in Figure 
4).  From Figure 4, we can tell that coefficients of different locations in block Blk have a 
different robustness since their corresponding quantization values differ at different 
locations. 
Secondly, we calculate the SV’s of subblock1, subblock2, and subblock3 of block Blk.  
Because we generate bits B1, B2, and B3 using the relationships among the SV’s and the 
relationships are more stable than the SV’s themselves, it is reasonable to assume that the 
regenerated watermark bit will be the same as the corresponding watermark bit in the 
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embedding process.  In other words, B1, B2, and B3, which encode the relationships 
between each pair of the SV’s of the quantized horizontal, vertical, and diagonal 
subbands, will not be changed even when the values of SV’s can be changed because of 
modifications of block Blk. 
Thirdly, we generate the watermark bit by using formula (5) to complement any 
possible changes in the three relationships encoded in B1, B2, and B3.  In other words, this 
step is to increase the possibility that the regenerated watermark bit is the same as the 
watermark bit generated in the embedding process, even when B1, B2, or B3 (i.e., either of 
the three relationships) is different from the ones generated in the embedding process.  
For example, changes in S1i (1, 1) may lead to the changes in any of two relationships, 
i.e., B1 and B3.  If both relationships are changed, our watermark generation process 
ensures that the regenerated watermark bit sequence is the same as the watermark bit 
sequence generated in the embedding process.  Even when either of the relationships is 
changed, the regenerated watermark bit sequence may still stay the same if B2 is changed.  
As a result, our proposed content-based watermark generation scheme is robust when 
incidental attacks are applied to the watermarked image.  Our extensive experimental 
results also confirm this.  
Here, we use one detailed example to illustrate the robustness of the secured 
watermark. 
Figure 9(a) shows generating the content-based watermark bit of a 4×4 block in the 
embedding process.  The block is from the example host image “Lena” whose size is 
512×512, and the coefficients of the block are the intersection of row 1 to 4 and column 9 
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to 12 of “Lena.”  So, the upper left 16 coefficients of quantization matrix Q are used in 
the modification process in Figure 9(a).  Figure 9(b) shows regeneration of the content-
based watermark bit of the block at the same position after applying JPEG compression 
on the host image.  Here, we choose a compression ratio as 75, which is the default 
compression ratio of jpeg compression in Matlab.  From Figure 9, we can see that even 
though the block has been changed after JPEG compression, the content-based watermark 
bit “Bit’” regenerated in the authentication process is the same as the watermark bit “Bit” 
generated in the embedding process. 
Tampering Detection Sensitivity 
The tampering detection sensitivity of the proposed scheme is determined by the 
quantizer.  The error map captures the changes in the quantization results and makes the 
tampering detectable for Zk   in the following two cases: 
1. The wavelet coefficient LLi’(1,1) of the watermarked image is 2kq, and the 
manipulation causes a shift of LLi’(1,1) in the range of [(0.5+2k)q, (1.5+2k)q). 
2. The wavelet coefficient LLi’(1,1) of the watermarked image is 2kq+q, and the 
manipulation causes a shift of LLi’(1,1) in the range of [(1.5+2k)q, (2.5+2k)q). 
That is, the scheme is capable of detecting all the changes satisfying the above two 
conditions.  Small changes of a half of the quantizer q or other changes falling in the 
range of [(-0.5+2k)q, (0.5+2k)q] in the distorted area do not modify the parity of the 
quantized approximation value.  As a result, the scheme is robust to moderate image 
content preserving attacks that do not dramatically change the pixel intensity.   
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Figure 9. Example of the robustness of the secured watermark. (a) Generate the 
content watermark bit of the 4×4 block in embedding process. 
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Figure 9 cont. Example of the robustness of the secured watermark. 
(b) Generate the content watermark bit of the 4×4 block in authentication process. 
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However, some pixels in the tampered area may be missed when the changes in the 
wavelet domain do not satisfy the above two conditions.  To address this shortcoming, 
the authentication process utilizes the distribution of the detected error pixels to evaluate 
the authenticity of the probe image.  Specifically, the observations shown in Figure 8 are 
incorporated to compensate for the possible misclassification in ErrorMap. Furthermore, 
q is adaptive in the proposed scheme. That is, q’s vary for different non-overlapping 
blocks in the proposed scheme. Such variation reduces even further the possibility of 
misclassifying, given that the range of [(-0.5+2k)q, (0.5+2k)q] where the 
misclassification will happen is inconsistent across the whole image. 
Generally, tampering detection sensitivity can still be adjusted by choosing different 
window sizes and thresholds.  If the threshold is preset, the larger the window size, the 
lower the sensitivity.  Based on the application requirements, the proposed scheme can 
identify various tampered areas and detect bigger alterations, while still bypassing 
smaller alterations using a predetermined window size. 
Localization Capability 
In the proposed scheme, image content is monitored by the embedded and extracted 
watermark.  Specifically, changing a value in the upper-left 2×2 corner of each 4×4 block 
may result in a mismatch in ErrorMap.  To compensate for the misclassification, we 
employ a window size of 3×3 to categorize each non-isolated error pixel as either 
strongly tampered or mildly tampered, as defined in the Watermark Authentication 
section of Chapter II.  Localization capability refers to the capability to find the smallest 
tampered area (also termed the detection unit) in a probe image.  Here, we start the 
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analysis with any possibly smallest 3×3 block in ErrorMap, wherein all nine pixels in the 
block are error pixels and all the pixels outside of the block are non-error pixels (shown 
in Figure 10(a.1)).  Based on the definition of three kinds of error pixels (illustrated in 
Figure 7), we know that the five error pixels marked by solid red circles are strongly 
tampered error pixels and all nine error pixels in the 3×3 block are tampered error pixels.  
Therefore, M2 = 5/9 = 0.5556, which is less than the threshold of Tmalicious (i.e., 0.6085), 
and we conclude that the 3×3 block is not a maliciously tampered area.  However, the 
values of M2 are 0.625 and 0.714 when the error pixel distributions follow the sample 
patterns shown in Figure 10(a.2) and Figure 10(a.3), respectively.  That is, the proposed 
scheme can achieve a 12×12 detection unit when the error pixels follow the sample 
distributions shown in Figure 10(a.2) and Figure 10(a.3). 
Next, we consider any 3×4 or 4×3 block containing 12 error pixels (shown in Figure 
10(b.1)) in ErrorMap.  All the remaining pixels in ErrorMap are non-error pixels.  To 
simplify the discussion, we only consider a block of 3×4 since the authentication results 
for a block of 4×3 can be similarly derived.  Based on the definition of three kinds of 
error pixels, we know that the eight error pixels marked by solid red circles are strongly 
tampered error pixels and all the 12 error pixels are tampered error pixels.  Therefore, M2 
= 8/12 = 0.6667, which is larger than the threshold of Tmalicious (i.e., 0.6085), and we 
conclude that the 3×4 block is a maliciously tampered area.  That is, the scheme can 
successfully achieve a 12×16 or 16×12 detection unit using the proposed authentication 
measures.  It can also correctly identify smaller malicious attacks within the detection 
unit of 12×16 (i.e., the tampered areas resulting from these malicious attacks are irregular 
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and nonblock-based), which follow the sample error pixel distributions as shown in 
Figure 10(b.2) through Figure 10(b.6), since their values of M2’s are all larger than the 
threshold of 0.6085. 
Table 2 summarizes error pixel distributions in a 3×3 block as shown inFigure 10(a), 
and Table 3 summarizes error pixel distributions in a 3×4 block as shown in Figure 10(b). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Illustration of different error pixels distributions in 3×3 and 3×4 blocks. 
Table 2 Error Pixel Distributions (a). 
figure number of cases error pixels strongly tampered pixels M2 value 
a.1 1 9 5 0.56 
a.2 4 8 5 0.625 
a.3 2 7 5 0.714 
 
Table 3 Error Pixel Distributions (b). 
figure number of cases error pixels strongly tampered pixels M2 value 
b.1 1 12 8 0.67 
b.2 4 11 8 0.73 
b.3 8 11 7 0.64 
b.4 4 10 8 0.8 
b.5 2 10 7 0.7 
b.6 4 9 7 0.78 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed semi-fragile watermarking scheme, we 
first compared the quality of the watermarked images of the proposed scheme and four 
peer schemes, namely, Maeno et al.’s scheme using the random bias [6], Yang and Sun’s 
scheme [15], Che et al.’s scheme [16], and Cruz et al.’s scheme [17], using five 
representative 8-bit 512×512 grayscale images.  We then conducted extensive 
experiments on 30 standard 8-bit grayscale images by comparing the proposed system 
with these four peer systems.  Different kinds of attempted manipulations were simulated.  
These simulated manipulations include the following: ten levels of image blurring, ten 
levels of Gaussian low-pass filtering, ten levels of median filtering, five levels of salt and 
pepper noise addition, ten levels of JPEG lossy compression, ten levels of JPEG2000 
lossy compression, adding an irregular shape of three kinds of gray-level intensities (i.e., 
black, gray, and white) without compression, and using Photoshop software to paste, 
delete, and modify an object. 
To ensure a fair comparison, we carefully studied the authentication process of each 
scheme to find its equivalent measure(s) to those used in the proposed scheme.  We found 
that all four peer schemes used a measure similar to the M1’s of the proposed scheme in 
their authentication process.  Yang’s scheme also used another measure similar to the 
M2’s of the proposed scheme.  In addition, Yang’s scheme explicitly summarized the 
thresholds for detecting a probe image as authentic, incidentally distorted, or maliciously 
distorted.  The other three schemes did not explicitly mention the thresholds for their 
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decision making.  However, we could roughly infer their thresholds from their 
discussions.  These thresholds are around 0.3 and are a little bit higher than Thalferrorbit 
(i.e., 0.2418) for M1’s in the proposed scheme.  All four peer schemes visually showed 
the error maps or the localization results without listing the values of their authentication 
measures.  That is, they all replied on the visual inspection to show the effectiveness of 
their localization results.  In the experiments on various malicious attacks, we showed 
both the values of the authentication measures and the localization results to validate the 
effectiveness of the proposed scheme. 
Watermark Invisibility 
Figure 11 summarizes the PSNR values after embedding watermarks in five 
representative images using the proposed scheme and four peer schemes, respectively.  
This figure clearly shows that all of the PSNR values are larger than 40.00 db and are 
comparable with the expected PSNR value computed in The Quality of the Watermarked 
Image section of Chapter III.  With the exception of Cruz’s scheme [17], the PSNR 
values of the proposed scheme are also higher than or comparable to the PSNR values of 
the four peer schemes that embeds watermark bits in larger blocks of 16×16. 
Robustness to Common Image Processing Attacks 
We performed four kinds of representative image processing attacks on 30 
watermarked images.  These attacks were ten levels of image blurring attacks using 
circular averaging filters of radii of 1.1 to 2 with an increasing step size of 0.1, ten levels 
of Gaussian low-pass filtering attacks using rotationally symmetric Gaussian low-pass 
filters of size 3×3 and standard deviation ranging from 0.1 to 1 with an increasing step 
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Figure 11. Comparison of PSNR values. 
size of 0.1, ten levels of median filtering attacks using filters of radii of 3 to 12 with an 
increasing step size of 1, and five levels of salt and peppers noise attacks using noise 
density ranging from 0.01 to 0.05 with an increasing step size of 0.01.  Since all four peer 
schemes used a measure similar to the M1’s of the proposed scheme in the authentication 
process, we plotted the average M1 values of 30 watermarked images under each image 
processing attack for all five schemes on the left side of Figure 12.  Yang’s scheme also 
used another measure similar to the M2’s of the proposed scheme in the authentication 
process.  As a result, we plotted the average M2 values of 30 watermarked images under 
each image processing attack for these two schemes on the right side of Figure 12. 
The left column in Figure 12 shows the comparison of various common image 
processing attacks on M1’s of the proposed scheme and four peer schemes, while the right 
column shows the M2’s of the proposed scheme and Yang’s scheme:  (a) image blurring  
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Figure 12. Comparison of various common image processing attacks. 
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attacks;  (b) Gaussian low-pass filtering attacks;  (c) median filtering attacks;  (d) salt and 
pepper noise attacks. 
Figure 12 clearly shows that all the average values of the values of M2’s of the 
proposed scheme are below the threshold line of 0.6085 for all image processing attacks. 
Specifically, the watermarked image under blurring, Gaussian low-pass filtering, or salt 
and pepper noise attacks were detected as authenticated if their M1 values were smaller 
than Thalferrorbit (0.2418) and as incidentally distorted if their M1 values were between 
Thalferrorbit (0.2418) and Terrorbit (0.4837).  The watermarked image under median filtering 
attacks with a filter size ranging from 3 to 7 was detected as incidentally distorted since 
its M1 value is between Thalferrorbit and Terrorbit.  However, the scheme detected the 
watermarked image under median filtering attacks with a larger filter size as a non-
copyrighted image since its M1 value is larger than 0.4837.  This is reasonable due to 
significant changes on the watermarked image.  In addition, as shown in Figure 12, all 
average values of M1’s of the proposed scheme under all image processing attacks except 
the “salt and pepper” attack are the smallest among all four schemes, and all average 
values of M2’s of the proposed scheme are smaller than the corresponding values of 
Yang’s method. As a matter of fact, M1’s of the proposed scheme under the salt and 
pepper attack are still comparable with those of Yang’s scheme as shown in Figure 12(d).  
This indicates that under any of these image processing attacks, the proposed scheme is 
more robust in classifying a watermarked image as authentic or incidentally distorted.  
Specifically, the proposed scheme successfully detected all 30 watermarked images under 
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Gaussian low-pass filtering, salt and pepper noise addition, or image blurring attacks with 
circular averaging filters of radii smaller than or equal to 1.4 as authentic. 
Robustness to JPEG Lossy Compression and  
JPEG2000 Lossy Compression Attacks  
 
We performed two kinds of compressions, namely, conventional JPEG lossy 
compression and JPEG2000 lossy compression, on 30 watermarked images.  The left plot 
of Figure 13 compares the average values of M1’s of 30 watermarked images under no 
attack and various JPEG compression attacks using quality factors of 100% down to 10% 
with a decreasing step size of 10% of all five schemes.  The right plot of Figure 13 
compares the average values of M2’s of 30 watermarked images under no attack and the 
same ten levels of JPEG compression attacks of the proposed scheme and Yang’s 
scheme.  Figure 13 clearly shows that all the average values of M2’s of the proposed 
scheme are much smaller than the corresponding average values of Yang’s scheme, and 
they are below the threshold line of 0.6085 for JPEG compressions of a quality factor 
down to 10%.  That is, the watermarked image under JPEG compressions of a quality 
factor down to 20% is detected as authentic if its M1 value is smaller than 0.2418 and as 
incidentally distorted if its M1 value is between 0.2418 and 0.4837.  In addition, the 
average M1 values of the proposed scheme generally are much smaller than the 
corresponding average values of four peer schemes for JPEG quality factors down to 
30%.  The proposed scheme is also the only one that increases steadily even when the 
quality factor is down to lower than 50%, while the others increase sharply.   
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Figure 13. Comparison of various JEPG compression attacks. 
All these data indicate that the proposed scheme is more robust in classifying a 
watermarked image under JPEG compressions of at least a 50% quality factor as 
authentic and classifying a watermarked image under JPEG compressions of a quality 
factor ranging from 10% to 50% as incidentally distorted.  The experimental results on 30 
watermarked images also confirm this.  None of the four peer schemes achieves the 
comparable performance as the proposed scheme.  Specifically, they detect the 
watermarked images under JPEG compressions of at least a 60% quality factor as 
incidentally distorted or authentic and detect the watermarked images under JPEG 
compressions of 10% to 50% quality factors as maliciously distorted. 
Figure 13 also shows a comparison of various JEPG compression attacks on M1’s 
(left) of the proposed scheme and four peer schemes and M2’s (right) of the proposed 
scheme and Yang’s scheme. 
To evaluate the robustness of the proposed scheme to JPEG2000 lossy compression 
attacks, we further compare the average values of M1’s and M2’s of 30 watermarked 
images under various JPEG2000 compression attacks using quality factors of 1000% 
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down to 100% with a decreasing step size of 100%, and their equivalent JPEG 
compression attacks using quality factors of 100% down to 10% with a decreasing step 
size of 10%, as shown in Figure 14.  We also plot the values of M1’s and M2’s under each 
attack after adding or subtracting the STDV (standard deviation values) from their 
average values.   As clearly shown in Figure 14, all the average values of M1’s and M2’s 
for JPEG2000 compression attacks are much smaller than the ones for JPEG compression 
attacks.  The relationship holds true for the average values of M1’s and M2’s adding or 
subtracting their corresponding STDV’s.  In addition, the values of M2’s are below the 
threshold line of 0.6085 for all JPEG2000 compressions, and the values of M1’s are 
below the threshold line of 0.2418 for all JPEG2000 compressions, except the one with 
the quality factor of 100%.  That is, the watermarked image under JPEG2000 
compressions of a quality factor down to 200% is detected as authentic.  The 
experimental results also clearly demonstrate that the proposed scheme is more robust 
against JPEG2000 compression attacks than JPEG compression attacks since it works in 
the wavelet domain, which is the same domain that JPEG2000 compression works in. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Comparison of JEPG2000 compression and JPEG compression attacks. 
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Finally, Figure 14 shows the comparison of various JEPG2000 compression attacks 
and their corresponding JPEG compression attacks on M1’s (left) and M2’s (right) of the 
proposed scheme. 
Fragility to Various Malicious Attacks 
We performed various malicious attacks on 30 watermarked images to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in localizing the maliciously tampered regions. 
The yellow sections in Figure 15 show the tampering localization results of five 
schemes after adding an irregular shape of three kinds of gray-level intensities (i.e., 
black, gray, and white) to the watermarked “Lena” image, wherein black is the most 
dissimilar to the background intensity and gray is the most similar to the background 
intensity.  We deliberately did not apply compression attacks to ensure that we could 
separate out the effect of JPEG compressions.  Figure 15 clearly shows that the proposed 
scheme achieves similar localization results to Che’s scheme and outperforms the other 
three schemes by correctly localizing the tampered regions regardless of the gray-level 
intensity of the added irregular shape.  In Figure 15, whenever applicable, we also list M1 
and M2 values in a pair for each scheme to facilitate comparison.  Based on the 
authentication algorithm, we conclude that the proposed scheme detects these three 
maliciously attacked watermarked “Lena” images as maliciously tampered and correctly 
localizes their tampered regions.  Yang’s scheme is able to detect the watermarked image 
adding a gray or white irregular shape as maliciously attacked.  However, it detects the 
watermarked image adding a black irregular shape as incidentally distorted.  It also does 
not produce a decent localization result under any of the three malicious attacks.  The  
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Figure 15. Comparison of malicious attacks (irregular shape). 
other three peer schemes obtain small values for M1’s, which are similar to the values 
obtained under image processing and JPEG compression attacks.  As a result, they detect 
these maliciously attacked watermarked “Lena” images as incidentally distorted based on 
the equivalent predefined thresholds. 
Figure 15 also shows a comparison of the localization results after adding an irregular 
shape of different intensities (black, gray, and white) without JPEG compression among 
the following (from left to right): the proposed scheme, Yang, Che, Maeno, and Cruz. 
Figure 16 demonstrates the tampering localization results on four additional 
representative watermarked images, which were maliciously attacked by adding the same 
irregular shape of three kinds of gray-level intensities (i.e., black, gray, and white) to the 
watermarked images.  We also list the M1 and M2 values in a pair below each localization  
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Figure 16. Illustration of the results of malicious attacks (irregular shape) of the 
proposed scheme. 
result.  This figure clearly shows that the proposed scheme successfully localizes the 
tampered regions.  Based on the predefined thresholds, we conclude that the proposed 
scheme detects all these maliciously attacked watermarked images as maliciously 
tampered. 
Figure 16 also illustrates the results of malicious attacks (irregular shape) of the 
proposed scheme: attacked images by adding black irregular shape (1
st
 column), the 
corresponding detected distortion regions (2
nd
 column), attacked images by adding gray 
irregular shape (3
rd
 column), the corresponding detected distortion regions (4
th
 column), 
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attacked images by adding white irregular shape (5
th
 column), and the corresponding 
detected distortion regions (6
th
 column). 
We further applied three kinds of more realistic modifications on the watermarked 
“Lena” image by using Photoshop to insert an external object (decoration on hat), modify 
the right eye, and remove the object (white and gray wavy decoration) on the lower right, 
respectively.  The maliciously attacked “Lena” image was then saved as a JPG image 
using the default compression setting.  Figure 17 demonstrates the localization results, 
shown in yellow, of five schemes and lists the M1 and M2 values, whenever applicable, in 
a pair for each scheme.  The figure clearly shows that the proposed scheme achieves the 
best and the cleanest localization results and that Maeno’s scheme achieves the second 
best localization results with a few additional small isolated distorted regions resulting 
from the JPEG compression.  Che’s scheme achieves localization results comparable to 
Maeno’s scheme except that it detects more distorted regions resulting from the JPEG 
compression due to less robustness to JPEG compression.  Based on the thresholds for 
the two authentication measures, we conclude that the proposed scheme detects all three 
maliciously attacked watermarked “Lena” image as maliciously tampered and correctly 
localizes their tampered regions.  Yang’s scheme detects these maliciously attacked 
watermarked images as maliciously distorted.  However, it does not produce a definite 
localization result under any of the three malicious attacks due to less robustness to JPEG 
compressions.  The other three schemes obtain small values for M1’s, which are similar to 
the values obtained under image processing and JPEG compression attacks.  As a result,  
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Figure 17. Comparison of malicious attacks (modified Lena by Photoshop). 
they detect these maliciously attacked images as incidentally distorted based on the 
equivalent predefined thresholds. 
Figure 17 shows the comparison of the localization results after realistic malicious 
attacks of the proposed scheme, Yang, Che, Maeno, and Cruz (from left to right). 
Figure 18 demonstrates the tampering localization results on four additional 
representative watermarked images, which were maliciously attacked by inserting an 
external object or removing (modifying) an object using Photoshop.  These maliciously 
attacked images were then saved as JPG images using the default compression setting.  
We also list the M1 and M2 values in a pair below each localization result.  This figure 
clearly shows that the proposed scheme successfully localizes the tampered regions.   
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Figure 18. Illustration of the results of malicious attacks (modified by Photoshop) of 
the proposed scheme. 
 
Based on the predefined thresholds, we conclude that the proposed scheme detects all 
these maliciously attacked watermarked images as maliciously tampered. 
Figure 18 also illustrates the results of malicious attacks (modified by Photoshop) of 
the proposed scheme: watermarked images (1
st
 column), maliciously attacked images by 
inserting an external object (2
nd
 column), the corresponding detected distortion regions 
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(3
rd
 column), maliciously attacked images by modifying or removing an object (4
th
 
column), and the corresponding detected distortion regions (5
th
 column). 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this thesis, we present a novel semi-fragile watermarking scheme for image content 
authentication with tampering localization.  The contributions of the proposed scheme 
are: 
 Utilizing the three relationships of SV’s of the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal 
subbands of each 4×4 block to extract content-based watermark in both 
watermark embedding and extraction processes. 
 Utilizing the summation of the three relationships of SV’s of the horizontal, 
vertical, and diagonal subbands of each 4×4 block to choose its adaptive quantizer 
q for both watermark embedding and extraction processes. 
 Applying the quantization method to embed the secured watermark, which is 
obtained by applying the “xor” operation on content-based watermark and the 
private-key-based content-independent watermark, in the wavelet domain so that 
a majority of image distortions, which cause the intensity shift by a value larger 
than a half of the quantizer q, can be detected in the authentication process. 
 Defining two authentication measures to quantitatively detect the authenticity of 
the probe image and prove tampering, with M1 measuring the overall similarity 
between extracted and embedded watermarks and M2 measuring the overall 
clustering level of the tampered error pixels. 
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 Using a binary error map together with the two authentication measures in the 
authentication process to compensate for possible misclassification in the error 
map, capture all possible distortions, and localize all possible tampered areas. 
My extensive experimental results show that the proposed scheme successfully 
distinguishes malicious attacks from nonmalicious tampering of image content.  It also 
accurately localizes maliciously tampered regions.  My scheme is more robust to 
acceptable content-preserving operations and more fragile to malicious distortions than 
four semi-fragile watermarking schemes. 
My future work includes studying the tampering detection sensibility of the proposed 
method when an image size changes, addressing geometric attack issues, and testing 
more images of various types. 
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